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Abstract: The size and distribution of the taxation supports for private pension provision has been a
contentious issue. Research produced or commissioned by representative groups of the pensions industry
in Ireland maintains that the tax supports are merely tax deferment, and the effective tax relief is lower
than the ‘headline’ relief on pension contributions. Research by the OECD, on the other hand, suggests
that pension savings are essentially tax free to the majority of pension savers. This paper estimates the
value of the favourable tax treatment to private pensions provision, expressed as a percentage of the
original amount invested, and analyses how it varies with income level, gender, saving period, and other
factors. The net effective tax relief on pension savings on each Euro invested in a private pension is
estimated by comparing the increase in the present value of pension savings over the lifetime of the
individual when compared to other savings. We report that the net effective relief is considerably higher
than estimated by the widely cited industry research, and depends on the value of the pension fund at
retirement. We identify three distinct groups of individuals in the current regime of incentivising pension
savings: those on low incomes who are offered no incentive, the standard rate tax-payers where the net
effective tax relief is about 25-30 per cent, and the higher rate tax-payers where the net effective relief
is about 31-51 per cent. We argue that current regressive taxation supports for pension savings should
be reformed, and reformed before the proposed imminent introduction of an auto-enrolment retirement
saving scheme.
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I INTRODUCTION
No rational agent would voluntarily lock their savings away until retirementunless there is a significant incentive to do so. This incentive is provided by
the tax advantages given to pension savings and, accordingly, the developed private
pensions industry in Ireland can be seen as dependent on tax supports. 
Similar to most OECD countries, Ireland encourages private pension provision
by granting tax relief to private pension savings. The Department of Finance
estimates that the annual cost of tax reliefs on pension savings is €2.4 billion, and
it represents the single biggest component of tax expenditures, accounting for about
45 per cent of total tax expenditures of €5.3 billion in 2014 (Department of Finance,
2017, p.7). According to the OECD, the overall budgetary cost in terms of tax relief
on contribution ranks Ireland the highest of 16 countries studied, with an estimated
cost in 2003 of 1.9 per cent of GDP (Yoo and de Serres, 2005, p.94). By 2050
taxation supports to private pensions in Ireland are expected to be the highest of all
countries in the OECD (OECD, 2009). 
The OECD (2009) has called for reform of taxation supports for private pension
in Ireland and reforms were included as part of the agreement with the Troika of
the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF in 2010 (European Commission,
ECB and IMF, 2010). There is also a growing body of academic literature to suggest
that Ireland could achieve a considerably better pension system for the considerable
tax expenditure by a better weighing of the public interest against the interests of
the pension industry (Doorley et al., 2018; Whelan, 2018; Collins and Hughes,
2017; OECD, 2016; Hughes, 2005; 2002; 2001).
On the other hand, the pension industry in Ireland contends that the tax
advantages on pensions are not tax relief but a tax deferment. Life Strategies (2008),
in a research report commissioned by the Irish Association of Pension Funds
(IAPF), contends that the value of the tax advantages is lower than the ‘headline’
marginal relief on contributions, and its value falls with increasing income above
a salary level of about €45,000. The Life Strategies (2008) report cites academic
literature to support their representation of their figures as the ‘true cost of tax
reliefs’. The Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2011) updates these figures in a
Position Paper on the Taxation of Private Pension Provision, using a more recent
tax code and somewhat different assumptions, and comes to the same broad
conclusions with their updated ‘true’ rates of tax reliefs. In particular, the Society
of Actuaries in Ireland reported in 2011 that tax relief is lower than the ‘headline’
marginal relief on contributions and falls rapidly for higher earners. This paper
disagrees with these findings and, after correspondence with one of the authors, the
Society of Actuaries in Ireland issued a supplementary note that amended their
original figures and findings (Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2017). 
A five-year roadmap for pension reform in Ireland was published in February
2018 (Government of Ireland, 2018a). Amongst other things, the roadmap commits
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to considering an auto-enrolment pension saving scheme for private sector workers,
with a consultation process in-progress, starting in August 2018 and expected to be
completed in early November 2018 (Government of Ireland, 2018b), with
implementation of the finalised scheme targeted for 2022. Part of the action and
commitment plan outlined in the Roadmap is to:
Review the cost of funded supplementary pensions to the Exchequer. To
inform decisions relating to financial incentives for retirement savings and
underpin the development of the automatic enrolment system, this will
include an assessment of the economic and social benefits delivered and an
evaluation of equity in the distribution of tax expenditure on pensions.
Government of Ireland (2018a, p.27).
This paper values the taxation supports to private pension provision in Ireland, and
provides an analysis of how the value of the tax advantages varies with the savers’
income level, saving period, gender, retirement age, and other factors that might
be significant. The layout of the paper is as follows. First, we set out the background
of policy formation in this area, concentrating on the last decade. Second, we outline
how the amount of the tax subsidy can be valued, and contrast the widely adopted
present value approach using the revenue-foregone method with other approaches.
Third, the model and its parameters are described and the key results are
summarised in tabular and graphic forms. The results are particularly sensitive to
the size of the pension fund at the point of retirement, so we survey the size of
individual pension savings in Ireland. We then compare the results of our analysis
with those of four other studies. We outline the sensitivity of the results to model
parameters. Finally, we investigate the effective subsidy to different pension savers
if they opted in to the proposed auto-enrolment pension scheme, assuming no
change in the current tax incentives. We report that the current system is regressive,
with those on lower incomes being given a lower percentage subsidy. We conclude
by summarising our findings and calling for reform of the current regressive
taxation supports for pension savings. 
II  CONTEXT
The OECD has persistently recommended reform of the tax expenditures on private
pension provision in Ireland since 1994. They cite four reasons: it is too generous,
it is not effective, it is inequitous, and it is unsustainable. 
Tax relief given against private pension contributions is a very significant
tax expenditure. As noted in the 2008 Survey, many pensions are unlikely to
be fully taxed at any point in the life cycle. [This is equivalent to an EEE
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(exempt-exempt-exempt) model of taxing income that goes towards
pensions, at the saving, accrual and payment stages (OECD, 2008)]. But the
current system of tax incentives does not provide an effective way of
achieving adequate private provision, despite the generous level of support.
They tend to act to divert funds from other investment, rather than to increase
overall pension saving, as they are poorly targeted at marginal savers. The
system performs badly in terms of equality since marginal tax relief on
pension contributions is worth more than twice as much to the minority of
high-income households paying the higher-rate of income tax than for those
paying the standard rate. The overall level of tax subsidy for pension savings
is projected to rise very sharply as the population ages and people build up
retirement savings. Indeed, Ireland is projected to have the largest share of
income committed to these schemes in 2050 of any OECD country. Reducing
the level should be accompanied by a better targeting of subsidies. 
OECD (2009, p.61).
Tax incentives, their overall cost and distribution, are obviously a sensitive issue
to the private pensions industry. The pension industry achieved considerable
influence over policy formulation from 1990 until 2014 through formal
representation on the Pensions Board, the industry regulatory body and the statutory
authority to provide ongoing advice on pension matters to the Minister for Social
Protection (Maher, 2016; Whelan, 2018). Maher (2016), through a detailed analysis
of the reports and consultations of the Pensions Board and interviews with key
policymakers, makes the case that the Pensions Board “implied that pension
taxation has been thoroughly analysed, although this was not the case” and by
suppressing international findings and recommendations for reform in taxation
supports demonstrated “an even more overt example of power is the complete
absence of reference to the findings and recommendations of the OECD’s 1994
report” (Maher, 2016, p.189). She concludes that 
…the OECD’s report was dismissed by removing a full examination of the
[tax] expenditure from the agenda, whilst simultaneously implying such a
review has already been completed (ibid., p.200).
The Life Strategies (2008) report was influential in forming policy. In November
2010, the Government of Ireland published the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014
which focussed on the urgent need to get the public finances back in order with
“No person, group or sector can be absolved from making a fair contribution to the
resolution of our economic difficulties” (p.8). It set a target of a total contribution
of €700 million from the pension sector over the period of the plan. It proposed a
phased reduction on income tax relief on contributions from the 41 per cent
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marginal rate to the 20 per cent standard rate over the following three years. It
referenced that Life Strategies (2008) report “the current tax arrangements are most
beneficial to those on earnings of about €45,000 per annum” and stated that the
Government “is willing to engage with the industry to examine alternatives to
deliver this outcome” (Government of Ireland, 2010, p.94). 
A reduction in private pension tax relief was incorporated into the formal
agreement to ensure financing from the Troika of the IMF, European Commission,
and ECB in early December 2010, with the commitment to raise tax revenues “by
reducing various pension-related tax reliefs” (European Commission, ECB and IMF
(2010), paragraph 23, p.8 of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies).
However, the then Fianna Fáil and Green Party coalition government was replaced
by a Fine Gael and Labour coalition following a general election in February 2011.
In practice, the new Minister of Finance, Michael Noonan, was equally open to
engage with the pensions industry to find an alternative solution to raise revenue
other than the standardisation of tax reliefs. When a small deputation from the life
assurance and brokerage community suggested to him that a temporary levy 
on pension funds was preferable (as had been imposed in the past), he agreed
(Maher, 2016, p.226) and the reform of the incentives for pension savings was
deferred. A levy of 0.6 per cent of the value of pension assets in the accumulation
phase was put in place, over each of the four tax years ending 2014. This was
expected to raise about €470 million each year. In his 2012 Budget Speech on 6
December 2011, Minister Noonan stated that the reform of the tax reliefs was
merely postponed: 
Although the EU/IMF Programme commits us to move to standard rate relief
on pension contributions, I do not propose to do this or make changes to the
existing marginal rate relief at this time. However, the incentive regime for
supplementary pension provision will have to be reformed to make the system
sustainable and more equitable over the long term. My Department and the
Revenue Commissioners will work with the various stakeholders in the next
year to develop workable solutions.
Minister Noonan, 6 December 2011. Quoted from Department of
Finance (2012), Strategy Group, Pension Taxation Issues 12/21 October
2012, p.6.
Maher (2016, pp.226-227) records that shortly after adopting the pensions levy,
Minister Noonan met with another group from the industry protesting its
introduction, where matters got heated and he accused the deputation of treason.
Later, in developing workable alternatives to the proposed standardisation of tax
reliefs, the Minister found the revenues raised by the alternative initiatives proposed
and costed by a pension industry representative group did not materialise and so
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he increased the levy to 0.75 per cent in 2014 and extended the levy into 2015 at
the reduced rate of 0.15 per cent (see Maher (2016), pp.229-231).1 From 2014 the
influence of the pensions industry over pensions policy was weakened when the
Pensions Act 1990, the statutory regulation of the industry, was amended to “obviate
any perception of ‘regulatory capture’ by the industry” (Government of Ireland
(2013a, p.47). 
Now that public finances are in better order it is timely to revisit the total cost
of tax incentives to private pension savings, its distribution and sustainability.
Indeed, the first research project identified by the Pensions Council formed in 2015
to advise the Minister of Social Protection was to examine this issue2 and this paper
has been prepared to help their deliberations. It is all the more timely as proposals
for a universal retirement savings system are already advanced and will shortly be
announced (Government of Ireland, 2018a).
OECD (2013) lists tax expenditure reforms on pensions in Ireland as part of its
key recommendations to “address the long-term spending pressures in the pension
system” (p.17), arguing that “reducing on tax expenditures would both lower
distortions to growth and improve equity” (p.15). This chimes with Government’s
commitment to 
… support economic growth by ensuring any tax increases be effected in the
first instance by base broadening through the elimination or curtailment of
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1 As the Department of Finance (2013) observes “there are issues around the scale and timing of the
Exchequer savings estimated by TPPG/Milliman” (p.4). TPPG was that Taxation Policy (Pensions) Group,
an alliance between the Society of Actuaries in Ireland, the Irish Insurance Federation and the Irish
Association of Pension Funds who engaged the actuarial consultancy Milliman and submitted alternative
proposals to the standard rating of pension tax relief that would raise similar revenues. The TPPG had
several meetings with the Department of Finance and the Revenue Commissioners over 2011 and 2012
and, with the aid of Milliman, produced a number of reports with costings that: “claimed savings to the
Exchequer of close to €400 million in a full year which would not, in their view, be significantly different
from the saving to the Exchequer from standard rating tax relief” (Department of Finance, 2013, p.3). In
the event, a modified version of the TPPG proposals was put in place and the revenue savings were estimated
by the Department of Finance to be of the order of just €120 million (see Noonan, Michael, 
16 April 2014, Written Answer to question posed by Pearse Doherty, Department of Finance: Consultancy
Contracts Expenditure, 18123/14). See also Maher (2016, pp.229-231), who provides a detailed analysis of
how the TPPG’s estimates of the additional Exchequer income could not be verified by the Department of
Finance and argues that “the lack of clarity around the TPPG’s figures completed the delegitimisation of
the industry and led to an extension of the third pension fund levy”. One of the authors of this paper asked
the Society of Actuaries in Ireland for sight of these TPPG/Milliman reports but was refused being told:
“Milliman advised that they cannot agree to you seeing these reports as they were prepared for the Society
of Actuaries in Ireland and the other members of the Taxation Policy Group and may have included
additional content if they had been intended for a wider audience; thus, they could be misinterpreted if
considered out of context”. Minutes of the Taxation Strategy Group 12/21 that also discussed the
standardisation of tax reliefs is partly redacted (Department of Finance (2012), see paragraphs 17, 24-27,
where it is not possible to follow their reasoning).
2 See Minutes of the Pension Council Meeting on 19 January 2017 and 21 September 2017, available here:
http://www.pensionscouncil.ie/en/Meeting-documents. 
overly-generous, poorly targeted or otherwise unaffordable tax reliefs.
Government of Ireland (2013, p.23). 
In particular, there have been proposals to decouple the incentives for pension
savings from the tax system and instead simply incentivise such savings by an
explicit subsidy or matching contribution of, say 38 per cent or 33 per cent of the
amount saved (e.g., Commission on Taxation, 2009; Government of Ireland, 2010).
Our analysis, presented later, estimates the current tax expenditure on each
contribution, so the cost-neutral subsidy can be estimated if such a scheme were to
replace the current one. 
Ireland is not unique in encouraging pension savings through the tax scheme,
with similar tax-based incentives in many EU and OECD countries (OECD, 2015a;
OECD, 2015b). The OECD is currently engaged in a study of financial incentives
for retirement saving to evaluate their cost effectiveness and their distribution and
to contrast them against alternative financial incentives such as government
matching contributions, government flat-rate contributions, or providing tax credits
rather than relief (OECD, 2014a). The project is also examining the efficiency of
abolishing incentives altogether and applying the cost of incentives to increase the
state pension instead. Our analysis in this paper fits into this broader international
project by providing a detailed study of the costs to the State of providing the tax
supports to pension savings in Ireland, by analysing who benefits from it and to
what extent, and how this might change with the introduction of the proposed auto-
enrolment supplementary scheme (see later). 
III STATE SUBSIDY THROUGH TAX RELIEFS TO PRIVATE 
PENSION PROVISION
Tax relief for pension savings in Ireland is granted at the individual’s full marginal
income tax rate on contributions made, investment returns, and the lump sum at
retirement or earlier death, and then tax is payable as earned income on pension
draw-down (see Appendix 1). This system is known as the ‘Exempt-Exempt-Partial-
Taxed system as opposed to the ‘Taxed-Taxed-Exempt’ system that applies to other
savings (that is income tax must be paid before saving, the investment returns are
taxed, but no tax is paid on withdrawals). Hence, when it comes to pension saving,
the State gives upfront tax relief over the entire savings phase, with some measure
of payback with pension drawdown which could be in several decades’ time. This
financial incentive to encourage pension provision is often referred to as ‘tax
expenditure’ by state agencies and as ‘deferred taxation’ by the pension industry in
Ireland. 
The questions naturally arise as to what this favourable tax treatment or subsidy
costs the State, who benefits from it, and to what extent. To answer these questions,
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it is necessary to compare the proceeds of an amount invested in a private pension
as compared to the same amount invested in another savings vehicle and estimate
the present value of each. Saving via a private pension leads to a higher present
value because of the differing tax treatment and the increase in the present value
over ordinary savings gives a measure of the value of the State subsidy to pensions.
If we express the increase in value as a percentage of the original amount invested
then the result is often termed the ‘net effective tax relief’ granted to pension savings
or, alternatively, the ‘true rate of tax relief’ or the ‘net tax cost per unit of
contribution’. In short, the net effective tax relief is the subsidy granted by the State
on each €1 invested in a private pension, as compared to other savings. 
An illustrative example will help in understanding how the net effective tax
relief on pension saving is calculated. In Table 1, we estimate the net effective tax
relief under the simplifying assumptions that the pension saver is subject to income
tax at the marginal rate of 40 per cent when working, at the standard rate of 20 per
cent when pension is being drawn down, and that investment returns on ordinary
savings are subject to an average rate of tax of 30 per cent. The example further
assumes that the saving period (that is the period between when the contribution is
made and its ultimate value is drawn-down) is 20 years, that investment returns are
5 per cent per annum gross, and the appropriate discount rate to estimate present
values is also 5 per cent per annum. 
Table 1 works through the calculations under these simplifying assumptions.
It shows that pension savings of €600 net to the individual grow to €2,653.3 over
the 20 years before tax on drawdown (due to the €400 tax refund when the
contribution is made and no tax on investment returns) while ordinary saving would
only grow to €1,176.6. Paying the assumed 20 per cent income tax when the
pension is eventually drawn down gives a net pension of €2,122.6, considerably
higher than the €1,176.6 from ordinary savings. The extra amount of €946.0 in
20 years’ time (that is €2,122.6 less €1,176.6) is discounted to the present day at
a discount rate of 5 per cent per annum and divided by the original €1,000 gross
invested to give the net effective tax rate of 35.7 per cent. 
The simplified model above leads to some insights. There are three distinct
components in calculating the net effective tax relief: the present value of the (1)
tax relief on pension contributions plus (2) the tax relief on investment returns on
the pension fund less (3) the tax on pensions when paid. In the illustrative example,
the net effective tax relief of 35.7 per cent is made up of (1) 40 per cent tax relief
on pension contributions, (2) 15.7 per cent tax relief on investment returns less (3)
20 per cent tax on the eventual pension. This insight allows us to conclude that if
no tax is paid on the eventual pension then the net effective tax relief goes up to
55.7 per cent, keeping everything else the same in the simple model. Also, it is clear
that the longer the period between initial saving and eventual drawdown, the bigger
the net effective tax relief as the value of the second component increases (that is,
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Table 1: Illustrative Example: Estimating the Net Effective Tax Relief on
Pension Savings in Ireland
Pension Saving                                    €         Ordinary Saving                                €
Individual’s Post-Tax Contribution   600.0     Individual’s Post-Tax Contribution   600.0
Tax Refund                                        400.0     Tax Refund                                            0.0
Initial Value of Fund                       1,000.0     Initial Value of Fund                          600.0
Gross Value of Fund End Year 1    1,050.0     Gross Value of Fund End Year 1       630.0
Tax Due                                                 0.0     Tax Due (i.e. 30 per cent of €30)          9.0
Net Value of Fund End Year 1        1,050.0     Net Value of Fund End Year 1           621.0
Gross Value of Fund End Year 2    1,102.5     Gross Value of Fund End Year 2       652.1
Tax Due                                                 0.0     Tax Due                                                 9.3
Net Value of Fund End Year 2        1,102.5     Net Value of Fund End Year 2           642.7
…                                                                    …                                                                
Gross Value of Fund End Year 20  2,653.3     Gross Value of Fund End Year 20  1,193.9
Tax Due                                                 0.0     Tax Due                                               17.3
Net Value of Fund End Year 20      2,653.3     Net Value of Fund End Year 20      1,176.6
Tax Payable on Drawdown                            Tax Payable on Drawdown                    0.0
(20 per cent of €2,653.3)                  530.7     
Net Value at Drawdown                 2,122.6     Net Value at Drawdown                  1,176.6
Present Value of Drawdown              800.0     Present Value of Drawdown              443.4
                                                                                                                                            
Net Effective Tax Relief on 
Original Contribution                       35.7%    
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
the value of the tax relief on investment returns on the pension fund). So if we
assume a savings period longer than 20 years then the net effective tax relief is
greater. 
However, a more sophisticated model must be developed to estimate more
accurately the net effective tax relief on pension saving. An amount put aside for a
pension now gets tax relief now, and on the investment income in each future year,
but tax and other deductions on earned income (e.g., USC, PRSI) is eventually paid
on the pension over the future period it is paid. The more sophisticated model must
forecast cashflows over this future period until the last pension drawdown, a
projection period that depends on the longevity of the pension saver and possibly
his or her spouse. Allowance must be made for how income taxation now and over
the future period depends on the then income level of the person – so, for instance,
the model must allow for the State contributory pension (including perhaps adult
dependent additions) during pension payment. The model must allow for taxation
on savings (both income and capital gains) now and over the projection period,
which again could depend on the then income of the person and the type of
investments made. Allowance must be made for inflation, for salary escalation, and
the rate of increase in the State pension over the long projection period. The model
must assume rates of return on investments and appropriate discount rates to
estimate the present value of future cashflows. This invariably leads to a
complicated model but, as we shall see, the results are similar to the simple
illustrative model. 
IV OTHER APPROACHES TO EVALUATING THE STATE SUBSIDY 
TO PRIVATE PENSION PROVISION
The estimates of the net effective rate of tax relief on private pension arrangements
presented in this paper are based on the present value approach using the revenue-
foregone method to measure tax expenditures. The revenue-foregone method
measures the amount by which tax revenues are reduced by a particular tax
concession under the assumption of unchanged behaviour. To do so we estimate,
over the future lifetime of the individual, the present value of the future flows of
tax revenues foregone on contributions and investment growth, and offset these
forgone tax revenues against the present value of tax revenues collected on pension
payments. We express the cost using the outlay-equivalent method, which expresses
the cost of providing the same monetary benefit to the individual through direct
spending, assuming that behaviour is unchanged as a result of the tax concession.
This approach is common in the literature (see, for instance, Munnell, 1991; Yoo
and de Serres, 2004; 2005; OECD, 2016). Pensions experts in Ireland, along with
the academic literature, favour the present value approach of revenue foregone (see,
for instance, Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2011; Life Strategies, 2008; Pensions
Board, 2005, pp.60-61).
The present-value approach to estimate the revenue forgone above can be
contrasted with the cash-flow approach to estimate the revenue forgone, used by
the Department of Finance (2017), the Revenue Commissioners (2016), and the
Department of Social and Family Affairs (2007). They estimate, using this
approach, the current annual cost of the subsidy to pension saving is about €2.4
billion (Department of Finance, 2017). The cash-flow approach looks at a calendar
year or other stated period and estimates the cost of tax concessions in that year or
period. It is done by estimating the total cost of tax relief on contributions in the
period (including the benefit-in-kind on employer’s contributions), the total cost of
tax relief on income and gains of pension funds in the period, and offsets these with
the estimated tax yield during the period on top-up pensions in payment. The
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problem with the cash-flow approach is that it mixes the cashflows of different
generations of pension savers in a single calendar year or other period. In short, the
cash-flow approach answers a different question, namely the cost to the State of
maintaining the tax reliefs in a year or other period, assuming no change to
behaviour if the tax incentives cease. The present value approach, on the other hand,
relates future additional tax flows from future additional pensions to current and
future tax expenditure that generates those tax flows, and thus computes the net
effective rate of tax relief. 
V DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE EFFECTIVE
TAX RELIEF ON PENSIONS
We developed a cashflow model to estimate the effective tax relief on pension
savings. We outline the key assumptions in our model and outline the results in this
section. Later we analyse the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions underlying
the model. The current tax reliefs on pension contributions, pension benefits, and
investment returns are summarised in Appendices 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
Collins and Hughes (2017, Table 4) report from their analysis of the Central
Statistics Office Survey of Income and Living Conditions from 2014 that the
average contribution per contributor to private pensions is 9.3 per cent of earnings
or €5,058 (including employer’s contribution if there is one) and the median
contribution is 8 per cent of earnings or €3,340. It seems reasonable therefore to
assume for the purposes of our modelling exercise that the average individual
contribution level (including the employer’s contribution) is of the order of 10 per
cent of earnings. 
There are fewer data on the average period of pension savings in Ireland.
Cooper (2002) shows, in the context of the similar British system, that it is more
financially advantageous for the pension saver to begin to save later in their working
life, after the high expense of child rearing and after mortgage is repaid – in short,
it is not optimum to have outstanding borrowings when pension saving due to the
higher risk-adjusted cost of borrowing: 
The author concludes that the usual message, to save a fixed proportion of
income throughout a working lifetime, is at best not helpful and at worst
could lead to a lower standard of living over the household’s lifetime. People
can and should manage the timing of their saving and borrowing in order
to achieve optimum incomes. Cooper (2002), Quote from Abstract, p.851.
This suggests that the average saving period is less than the average working career.
We have assumed that the average saving period of those that save for a pension is
25 years. Evidence based on the size of individual pension retirement accounts and
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the value of individual pension entitlements considered in a later section are not
inconsistent with this assumption but suggest, if anything, this input to our
modelling probably errs on being too high an estimate, (maybe especially so for
women whose career earnings are reduced during periods of unpaid caring duties).
Later we discuss the sensitivity of our results when the saving period is longer or
shorter than the assumed 25 years.
At retirement, we assume the retiree will take one-quarter of the fund as a tax-
free lump sum (see Appendix 1), as this is the more financially valuable option.
The remainder of the fund is assumed to be drawn down evenly over 20 years. The
results of our analysis are not especially sensitive to the draw-down period (that is,
the period in retirement) as we discuss later. We further assume that the pensioner
qualifies for full contributory State pension at retirement, with full dependant’s
pension if there is an adult dependant.
Employer contributions are treated as a benefit-in-kind to the employee so are
treated in the same manner as employee contributions. That is, employer
contributions are considered as if they are paid to the employee as part of their
salary who then saves them in a pension arrangement. This is the standard approach
in treating employer contributions in these modelling exercises. 
Income tax bands and reliefs depend on the marital status of the individual.
Accordingly, we have provided figures on the alternative bases that the individual
is (1) a married person in a single income household, and (2) a single person.
The economic and investment assumptions employed are consistent with
widely adopted bases in the industry for reasonable projections of pension values,
and similar to those used in OECD (2016).3 In short, we assume that future inflation
is 1½ per cent per annum over the projection period and wage growth is 2½ per
cent per annum (so wage growth is assumed to be, on average, 1 per cent per annum
higher than inflation over the projected period). Investment returns are assumed to
average 4½ per cent per annum after investment charges. At retirement and after
taking the tax-fee lump sum, the retirement fund is assumed to be invested in less
risky investments, providing a net real return of ½ per cent per annum. Consistent
with these assumptions, we further assume that
• The State contributory pension (and the adult dependant’s allowance) increase
in line with general salary escalation.
• Tax on future earned income is payable at the same percentage rate as it is at
current salary levels. So, say, the proportion of a current salary paid in tax or
other deductions is x per cent, then the proportion of the future salary payable
as tax or other deduction is also x per cent, when the salary is escalating at the
assumed wage growth rate.
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3 See, for instance, the Society of Actuaries in Ireland, Actuarial Standard of Practice PEN-12, Statement
of Reasonable Projection – Occupational Pension Schemes and Trust RACs. [Version 1.6, effective from 
1 October 2017].
A key assumption in our model is the tax rate assumed on investment income, as
the result is particularly sensitive to the rate assumed. Appendix 3 briefly treats the
taxation of investment income and gains on pension savings and compares it with
the taxation of other savings vehicles. It shows that non-pension savings are
typically subject to a capital gains tax at a rate of 33 per cent (above a low threshold)
and that income generated from investments (by way of dividends, rents, or interest)
are typically charged at the marginal rate of income tax of the individual saver (so
20 per cent for standard rate tax-payers and 40 per cent for higher rate tax-payers).
This suggests that standard rate tax-payers pay tax on investment returns (from
income or capital gains) at somewhere in the range 20 per cent to 33 per cent while
higher rate tax-payers pay tax on investment returns at somewhere in the range 
33 per cent to 40 per cent. In our modelling, we provided figures based on the
assumption that the effective rate of tax on investment returns is 20 per cent and,
alternatively, 30 per cent. The lower 20 per cent rate is more suitable to use for
those whose income level has them paying income tax at the standard rate, while
the 30 per cent rate is more suitable for those paying income tax at the higher level.
In both cases, we believe our estimate of the value of the tax relief granted on
investment returns from pension saving is, if anything, slightly understated.
VI  RESULTS: THE NET EFFECTIVE RATE OF TAX RELIEF ON
PENSION SAVING IN IRELAND
An individual that saves 10 per cent of salary over the 25 years prior to retirement,
and does not take a lump sum but draws down the retirement fund evenly over 20
years in retirement can expect a pension of about one-fifth of salary, additional to
any State contributory pension, according to our earlier modelling assumptions. If
a tax-free lump sum of one-quarter the fund is taken at retirement, the remaining
fund would provide a pension of about the one-seventh of salary. The net effective
rate of tax relief granted by the State to such an individual depends on their level
of income and marital status. In Table 2 and Figure 1 we set out the results from
our modelling exercise of the net effective rate of tax relief at different income
levels, for both married and single individuals and with tax on investment returns
assumed to be at either 20 per cent or 30 per cent. Please note that due allowance
has been made for PRSI and USC deductions (see Appendix 1 for details of rates
and bands).
Table 2 and Figure 1 show that there are three distinct income levels that benefit
from the tax advantages of pensions savings to different degrees. First, the higher
rate tax-payers benefit the most. Next is the standard rate tax-payers where the tax
advantages per unit invested are about 20 per cent less than the higher rate tax-
payers. Finally, the group who are exempt from income tax because of low income
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to which the current system offers no incentive to save for a pension. In fact, often
this low income group is disincentivised from saving for pensions with a negative
expected return under our model as USC is levied on eventual pension drawdown.
These three distinct groups are blurred around the edges, as individuals transition
between them.
A key insight from our model is that the net effective rate of tax relief depends
significantly on the value of the fund at the point of retirement. As a rule of thumb,
a married couple can accrue a fund of up to nine times the average national salary
level in Ireland (or one-third of a million Euros in present day terms) at the point
of retirement without paying tax at any point on the savings – tax is not paid on
contributions, on investment returns, or on the pension. Effectively, the tax system
is an exempt-exempt-exempt (EEE) for savings up to this amount. Single people
can save up to about four times the average national salary level (or €150,000 in
present day terms) without being subject to tax at any point in the savings cycle.
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Table 2: Net Effective Rate of Tax Relief, Estimated Assuming 
Individual Saves 10% of Salary over the 25 Years Prior to Retirement, 
Takes 25% of Total Fund at Retirement as a Lump Sum and 
Draws Down the Remainder Evenly Over 20 Years. Tax on Investment
Income Assumed to be Either 0% (For Income Levels Below the 
Income Tax Threshold), 20% or 30%.
                 Married Person, one income household               Single Person
                                                 
Salary                  Tax on Investment Income             Tax on Investment Income
(€)                                   assumed at                                     p.a. assumed at
                                0%            20%            30%                  0%         20%          30%
5,000                       –5%              –                 –                    –1%           –               –
10,000                     –1%              –                 –                    1%           –               –
20,000                     –3%              –                 –                       –            25%          30%
30,000                        –              26%           30%                    –            26%          30%
40,000                        –              26%           31%                    –            44%          49%
50,000                        –              46%           51%                    –            38%          42%
60,000                        –              46%           51%                    –            33%          38%
70,000                        –              46%           51%                    –            32%          37%
80,000                        –              46%           51%                    –            32%          36%
90,000                        –              44%           49%                    –            31%          36%
100,000                      –              42%           46%                    –            31%          36%
110,000                      –              39%           43%                    –            31%          36%
120,000                      –              36%           41%                    –            31%          36%
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Note: Figures in bold represent best estimates. 
Box 1: Summary of the Model Outcomes, for Pension Savings up 
certain limits
Low Income (so do not pay income tax)
Current system offers no incentive to save for a pension (sometimes
disincentivises)
Net Effective Tax Relief Rate c. 0 per cent
Standard Rate Tax-Payers 
EEE system applies up to a retirement fund of nine times average national salary
level or €0.33 million for married couple with one income household. 
Or to a retirement fund of four times average national salary level or €150,000
[Single]
Net Effective Tax Relief Rate c. 25-30 per cent
Higher Rate Tax-Payers 
EEE system applies up to a retirement fund of nine times the average national
salary or €0.33 million [Married, one income household] 
Or to a retirement fund of four times average national salary level or €150,000
[Single]
Net Effective Tax Relief Rate c. 31-51 per cent.
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Figure 1: Best Estimate of Net Effective Rate of Tax Relief on Pension
Savings
Source: Authors’ own calculations. See Table 2.
We varied the investment and economic assumptions underlying our model to
examine the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions. We found our
conclusions above robust to reasonable changes in these parameters – that is, the
results of this additional modelling replicated the overall distribution and magnitude
of the results of the central model assumptions above.
One limitation of our modelling should be borne in mind: the model only
analyses the interaction between supplementary pension savings, the tax system,
and the contributory pension system. The wider interaction of supplementary
pension savings with the social welfare system has not been treated. This limitation
of our modelling exercise could impact the effective rate of return on additional
pension saving for the lower paid. So, for instance, it is a possibility that those on
low pay, or with a limited career in paid employment, who might not be eligible
for the full State contributory pension come retirement, might have any pension
savings means-tested to reduce the non-contributory pension payable – hence the
individual might not benefit, or benefit to only a limited degree, from extra pension
saving. This would effectively be a negative tax relief on this supplemental pension
saving.
Table 3: Expected Top-Up Pension and Total Pension for a Married Person,
with one Income in the Household Assuming the Individual Saves 10% of
Salary over the 25 Years Prior to Retirement, Does Not Take a Lump Sum
but Draws Down the Pension Evenly Over 20 Years.
Salary                  State           State                Top up       Top up          Total          Total
                         Pension       Pension            Pension     Pension       Pension     Pension
                       (monetary      (% of           (monetary    (% of        (monetary     (% of
                           value)         salary)              value)       salary)          value)       salary)
€5,000            €23,575          471%           €972         19%         €24,547         491%
€10,000          €23,575          236%           €1,944         19%         €25,519         255%
€20,000          €23,575          118%           €3,888         19%         €27,463         137%
€30,000          €23,575          79%           €5,832         19%         €29,407           98%
€40,000          €23,575          59%           €7,776         19%         €31,351           78%
€50,000          €23,575          47%           €9,720         19%         €33,294           67%
€60,000          €23,575          39%           €11,663         19%         €35,238           59%
€70,000          €23,575          34%           €13,607         19%         €37,182           53%
€80,000          €23,575          29%           €15,551         19%         €39,126           49%
€90,000          €23,575          26%           €17,495         19%         €41,070           46%
€100,000        €23,575          24%           €19,439         19%         €43,014           43%
€110,000        €23,575          21%           €21,383         19%         €44,958           41%
€120,000        €23,575          20%           €23,327         19%         €46,902           39%
€130,000        €23,575          18%           €25,271         19%         €48,846           38%
€140,000        €23,575          17%           €27,215         19%         €50,790           36%
€150,000        €23,575          16%           €29,159         19%         €52,734           35%
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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For completeness, we set out in Table 3 the expected additional pension and
total pension for a married person, with one income in the household assuming the
individual saves 10 per cent of salary over the 25 years prior to retirement, does
not take a lump sum but draws down the remainder evenly over 20 years. Note that
such a savings plan achieves or exceeds the original National Pensions Policy
Initiative target of a 50 per cent replacement income after retirement for those on
salaries up to c.€80,000 per annum (see Pensions Board, 2005).
VII SIZE OF INDIVIDUAL PENSION SAVINGS
Data are not readily available on the value of pension funds attributed to individuals
in Ireland. However what information there is suggests that the average pension
pot is below the thresholds identified above. Accordingly, the majority of pension
savers will pay no tax on their pension savings at any point in their lifecycle. 
Consider the average value of pension pots in the accumulation phase. The
Pensions Authority Annual Report and Accounts 2016, reports that the number of
Personal Retirement Savings Accounts (PRSA) is 250,719 at the end of 2016 with
total assets of €5.6 billion (p.33). This gives an average PRSA account of €22,336.
Of course, these accounts can still grow before retirement and individuals could
have more than one account but there is considerable scope to save more before
any tax liability will be incurred. There are other personal pension arrangements
available in Ireland, such as Retirement Annuity Contracts or Buy Out Bonds, but
there is no register of their number or size (Department of Social Protection, 2012,
p.25).
There is more information available on the number and size of occupational
pensions. The Pensions Board (2014) reported 886,405 active members of
occupational defined contribution schemes in 2013 with total assets as at the end
of 2011 of €26.5 billion (pp.2-3). This gives an average pension pot of €30,586.
The Pensions Authority (2017b), estimates that there are 415,300 deferred members
in defined benefit pension funds with an average liability of €12.0 billion, giving
an average liability per deferred member of €28,895. There are 111,397 active
members of such schemes with a liability value of €11.9 billion, giving an average
liability value of €106,825. 
The average size of the pension pot at retirement is even more difficult to
estimate from the available data. The Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2015)
estimates that at the end of 2013 there were 56,000 retirees with Approved
Retirement Funds with a total value of €6 billion (see pp.13-14). This is an average
retirement pot of €107,143 each. The Pension Authority (2017b) estimates that the
pensioners in funded defined benefit schemes number 102,015 in 2016, with a total
liability value of €34.0 billion. This gives an average liability value of €333,284. 
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Accordingly, a review of the available statistics on the number and value of
pension entitlements suggests that the majority are too small to ever incur a tax
liability. Our analysis agrees with the earlier conclusion of the OECD (2008) that
in Ireland “many pensions are unlikely to be fully taxed at any point in the life
cycle”. The tax incentive as applied in practice amounts to tax-free saving for
pension for most, rather than tax deferred saving. Given its importance for policy
development, we recommend that data on the pension assets of current workers and
pensioners be collected and published in a more systematic manner than currently. 
Collins and Hughes (2017, Table 5, p.503) estimate that in 2014, 70.6 per cent
of pension savers are in the higher rate tax bracket, so that pension savers are
enjoying tax relief of 31-51 per cent, according to Table 2. Indeed, they report that
more than half of the total tax relief on contributions in 2014 went to those in the
top income decile in Ireland, and more than 80 per cent went to the top three income
deciles (Collins and Hughes, 2017, Table 6, p.504)
Yoo and de Serres (2004) note that Ireland is an outlier amongst OECD
countries as the actual cost to the State of tax relief on contributions made is 1.9
per cent of GDP, the highest of all countries studied (Figure 4, p.38) and implies a
very high average contribution expressed as a percentage of the average wage
(Figure 5, p.38). In fact, the average contribution as a percentage of the average
wage in Ireland (at 37.6 per cent) is more than twice that of the next nearest country
in the calendar year 2000. This suggests that pension saving in Ireland is skewed
in terms of amounts saved to very high earners.
There have been two official reviews of the taxation supports to pensions since
1985: Commission on Taxation (2009), already alluded to, and Department of
Finance (2005). The Department of Finance (2005) review reported, among other
things, that in many cases the tax reliefs were very generous and the relief was
sometimes used for wealth and estate planning rather than for pension purposes. 
It highlighted a couple of cases where the pension fund was about €100 million
and, in bold, states: 
the analysis does suggest, however, that for those who have the capacity to
survive in retirement without the need to rely on funds invested in an ARF,
our “EET” system of pension taxation is much closer to an “EEE” system
where effectively no tax is paid, or if it is, it is at a low rate and far into the
future (p. G22). 
Indeed, the publication notes that the only tax paid could be limited to taxation on
transfer on death. These findings prompted some amendments to the taxation code,
placing limits on fund size (now €2 million) amongst other things, although those
in breach were allowed to apply for exemption. This report makes the following
key point in the first paragraph of the executive summary:
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Current tax reliefs appear to be very generous in relation to individuals
whose employers are in a position to make substantial tax deductible
contributions to their schemes effectively without limit, particularly in
circumstances where they can influence the level of employer contributions
and their remuneration level.
Department of Finance (2005), p.G2. 
In this regard, it is of interest to note that, outside of frozen schemes (that is, where
benefits no longer increase with service) where the number of members is not
known, over 80 per cent of funded pension schemes in Ireland are single member
schemes (Pensions Authority, 2016b). So, of the 84,519 total (non-frozen) funded
schemes in Ireland, some 68,602 are single member pension schemes (ibid., p.6).
Indeed, as the Pensions Authority remarks, despite Ireland’s small size: “Ireland
has more small and single member schemes than any other country in Europe” (p.9)
and there are “over 180,000 individual and corporate trustees listed in the
Authority’s records” (p.9). In fact, considering all pension schemes, with “just 1
per cent of the EU population, Ireland is home to about 50 per cent of all pension
schemes in the EU” (Government of Ireland, 2018a, p.14). Perhaps further study is
warranted to ascertain the proportion of these single member schemes where the
member can influence the employer’s contribution level or their own remuneration
level.
VIII SENSITIVITY OF RESULTS TO MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
The results of the model are dependent on the assumptions used. There are two
distinct categories of assumptions required in the modelling exercise: assumptions
relating to the individual saver and broader economic and investment assumptions.
The results are not particularly sensitive to the latter, as discussed earlier. In this
section we analyse the sensitivity of the results to the saving and drawdown pattern
of the individual pension saver.
The assumptions regarding the individual pension saver relate to: the level of
the contributions towards their pension; the period the individual will save for their
pension; and the length of time the individual will draw down their pension. The
overall pattern of the net effective tax relief is not fundamentally changed by
altering these factors. We treat each of these in turn below.
8.1 Contribution Level 
Employee pension contributions are tax free, subject to certain limits which are age
related. This tax relief is granted at an individual’s marginal rate of tax, but there is
no relief from PRSI deductions and the Universal Social Charge. Appendix 1 sets
out the available tax relief on employee and employer contributions in more detail.
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We investigated the sensitivity of the results of our modelling earlier to the
level of the contribution rate. Keeping all other assumptions unchanged, we
considered the impact on the net effective rate of tax relief if contribution rates were
5 per cent or 15 per cent over the complete saving period. As before, we modelled
the results for both single and married persons with tax on investment income
assumed at both 20 per cent and, alternatively, 30 per cent. Below are the results
assuming a tax rate of 20 per cent on investment income. The pattern of the
distribution of the net effective tax relief granted assuming a tax rate of 30 per cent
on investment income developed in a similar, but higher, pattern.
Figure 2: Sensitivity to Contribution Rate, Married Person, 20 Per Cent Tax
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
Figure 3: Sensitivity to Contribution Rate, Single Person, 20 Per Cent Tax 
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations. 
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There is very little difference in the net effective rate of tax relief for a married
individual earning less than €60,000, as the contribution rate varies from 5 per cent
to 15 per cent of income. Above a salary level of about €60,000, an increase in
contribution rate results in a gradual reduction in the net effective tax relief
available. 
For single person, the pattern is similar but now the peak in net effective rate
of tax relief occurs at a lower salary level as the contribution rate increases. 
8.2 Saving Period 
The saving period assumed earlier was 25 years. As previously noted this may be
considered too long, particularly for women whose employment pattern tends to
be more fragmented. We explore the sensitivity of the results of our modelling to
this assumption by considering the impact on the results if the contribution period
was 15 years, 35 years or 40 years, and set the results alongside the results from
our central assumption of 25 years. In undertaking this analysis, all the other core
assumptions remain unchanged, i.e. we have assumed a contribution rate of 10 per
cent, a drawdown period of 20 years, and we provide results for both single and
married persons. We only set out the results of the analysis assuming a 20 per cent
rate of tax on investment returns, but a similar pattern emerges but with a higher
rate of net effective tax relief if a higher rate on investment returns is assumed.
For a married person earning up to €40,000 p.a., an increase in the savings
period results in an increase in the net effective tax relief. For those earning between
€60,000-€90,000 p.a., the optimum period of saving to maximise the net effective
tax relief is in the region of 25 years, whereas for those earning above €90,000 the
optimum savings period to maximise tax relief received reduces to 15 years. 
Figure 4: Sensitivity to Saving Period, Married Person, 20 Per Cent Tax 
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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As illustrated below, for a single person on an income of €20,000 or less, an
increase in the savings period will result in a significant increase in the net effective
tax relief. For those earning between €50,000-€100,000 p.a. increasing their saving
period beyond 15 years results in a net reduction in the effective tax relief, and for
those earning above €110,000 the impact of an increase in their savings period is
negligible. 
Figure 5: Sensitivity to Saving Period, Single Person, 20 Per Cent Tax 
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
This analysis highlights an interesting anomaly in the current system of tax relief
for pension saving. A single person on a salary of €10,000 gets net effective tax
relief of less than 1 per cent to save for their pension for a period of up to 15 years,
whereas a single person earning a salary of between €40,000-€80,000 p.a. would
receive net effective tax relief in the region of 40 per cent (Figure 5). Likewise
Figure 4 highlights, under the current system of tax relief, a married person earning
a salary of €20,000 p.a. who currently makes pension contributions for a period of
15 years will receive tax relief in the region of -0.20 per cent (i.e., it will effectively
cost them to save for their pension). 
8.3 Longevity (Period in Retirement)
Women live longer than men, on average, and wealthier people live longer than the
less wealthy on average. We investigated the sensitivity of the effective tax subsidy
to the longevity assumption to determine which groups are better incentivised. To
do so we compare the results of our modelling if the post-retirement period of 20
years (as originally assumed) was increased to 25 years, assuming all other
parameters remained the same and assuming tax rate of 20 per cent on investment
returns. The results of this analysis are shown graphically in Figures 6 and 7.
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Figure 6: Sensitivity to Longevity, Single Person, 20 Per Cent Tax 
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Figure 7: Sensitivity to Longevity, Married Person, 20 Per Cent Tax 
on Investment Income
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
The results are not particularly sensitive to longevity. Extended longevity tends to
increase the effective tax relief for higher earners. 
We conclude this section by summarising the results in Box 2.
Box 2: Summary Results of Our Sensitivity Analysis
The results of our modelling, summarised in Box 1, are not particularly sensitive
to the economic and investment assumptions used. The results are reasonably
robust to individual savings patterns, such as the level of contributions, the saving
period, and the period in retirement.
The net effective rate of tax relief varies primarily by income level, with
those earning more enjoying a higher net effective rate of tax relief on pension
savings. Accordingly, women as a group are less incentivised to save for a
pension than men as a group due primarily to their lower earnings.
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IX COMPARISON OF OUR RESULTS WITH THOSE OF 
OTHER STUDIES
Yoo and de Serres (2004) provide a comparative international evaluation of the tax
incentive schemes for pension savings in all OECD countries. The pension saver
in Ireland is assumed to be subject to tax at the standard rate (p.10 and Figure 1 on
p.44 and Table 3 on p.29). Using a similar present value methodology to us (but
with different assumptions, especially on tax on pension income, and using the tax
code in force in 2003), they estimate the net cost per unit of contribution for a
pension saver in Ireland is about 29 per cent (Table 3, p.29). This compares well
with our estimate of 25-26 per cent in Table 2 for standard rate tax-payers. 
Chapter 2 in OECD (2016) provides a more up-to-date and detailed analysis
of the tax advantages on pension savings in many countries, including Ireland. It
reports that the overall net effective rate of relief for the average wage earner in
Ireland in 2015 was 35 per cent, comprising 40 per cent tax relief on contributions,
24 per cent as the present value of tax relief on investment returns, less 29 per cent
as the present value of tax paid on pensions (Table 2.5, p.64). The average annual
earnings in Ireland in 2016 was €36,919, while the average annual earnings for
full-time workers in Ireland was €45,611 (CSO, 2017). Their model assumed a 10
per cent contribution rate of salary over the entire future working life (from 20 years
of age to 68 years of age), assumed inflation at 2 per cent, salary escalation at 1.5
per cent above inflation, and a 3 per cent real rate of return on investments (and,
accordingly, a 3 per cent real discount rate). The 35 per cent net effective relief
reported by the OECD (2016) is consistent with the figures presented in Table 2
earlier for higher rate tax-payers.
There have been two other reports analysing the value of the tax incentive
scheme for pension saving in Ireland and showing how it varies by income level:
Life Strategies (2008) and the Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2011). The net
effective tax relief reported in these studies is materially different from our earlier
figures and those of the OECD. Both reports, using the same present value
methodology, suggest that ‘true’ rate of tax relief is lower than the headline rate of
tax relief on contributions, peaks for those earning around €40,000 to €45,000 per
annum, and then declines. The report of the Society of Actuaries suggests that the
net effective tax relief declines to be close to 0 per cent for higher earners. As noted
earlier, these industry reports have been influential in forming policy in this area.
Our figures show that, under our central assumptions, the ‘true’ rate of tax relief is
higher than the headline rate of tax relief on contributions for the vast majority of
pension savers. The tax relief granted for higher rate tax-payers does not decline to
be close to zero but remains in excess of 25 per cent in all cases modelled, including
in the sensitivity modelling. In fact, our analysis points to anomalies with the current
tax-based incentive system for lower earners, which were not identified in these
industry studies.
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We believe that the figures for the ‘true’ or net effective tax relief presented in
these reports are incorrect and misleading. The Society of Actuaries in Ireland in
its 2011 report states that it estimates the “‘true’ rate of tax relief” by “offsetting
the stream of projected future tax revenues against the stream of projected future
reliefs and taking the present value of the projected net relief/revenue in each future
year” (p.5). However, like the earlier Life Strategies (2008), it assumes that the tax
on fund growth is 0 per cent. In short, it ignores the value of the tax relief on
investment income and capital gains. Further, the financial assumptions used state
that they assume fund growth at 5 per cent per annum but discount the proceeds
from this growth at, they state, 3 per cent per annum. This also appears inconsistent
to us. Overall both reports did not compare the tax differences between an EET
system and TTE, despite the commentary stating that is what is being done, but
compared an EET system and a TEE system. The main conclusion of the Society
of Actuaries in Ireland report that the “effective rate of tax relief is lower than the
headline rate” (Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2011, p.6) is a straightforward
consequence of the approach adopted and did not require any calculations to arrive
at that conclusion.
One of the authors raised these issues with the Society of Actuaries in Ireland
and has been in ongoing contact since November 2016, pointing out the two
possible errors and the belief that the figures in their position statement are
misleading and should be corrected. The Society agreed in April 2017 to review
the methodology. The review concluded: “In summary, we [the Society of Actuaries
in Ireland] are satisfied that the paper was prepared on a basis which was
appropriate at that time and which was clearly explained in the paper”. When the
Society was made aware that we intended to publish our results which materially
differs from theirs, it prompted the Society to undertake a “fresh review”, which
identified the two errors.
The Society issued a supplementary note at the end of November 2017 to
correct the two errors. The supplementary note states, in bold, that 
all references in the paper to ‘the value of tax relief’ were intended to mean
‘the value of tax relief on contributions’ and likewise all references to ‘the
effective rate of relief’ were intended to mean ‘the effective rate of relief on
contributions’. (Society of Actuaries in Ireland, 2017, paragraph 3.8). 
The supplementary note also agrees that the discount rate assumption originally
used was not correct: 
The Society now considers that it would have been more appropriate to have
used an approach where future contributions, the tax relief granted on them
and the tax and USC payable on the pension were discounted to 2011 at an
appropriate discount rate (ibid., paragraph 4.4). 
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The Society provided corrected figures caused by this error but did not estimate
the value of the tax exemption on investment returns, simply noting in the
conclusion that 
In considering any change... policymakers may have regard to the total value
of tax incentives and the Society agrees that the value of tax exemption on
investment returns forms part of that value. (ibid., paragraph 5.2). 
The results of our analysis are consistent with those of the OECD and provide more
information on how the value of the tax reliefs on pension saving vary with income
level and other factors. The Society of Actuaries in Ireland (2011) position paper
on this topic has been amended, in both the drafting and in the figures, so it is no
longer inconsistent with the results presented here. Perhaps the main point to take
from these industry reports is that there is little understanding of the value of the
tax incentives in Ireland to encourage pension savings by those advising pension
plans, so the State might be better in incentivising pension savings in another, more
straightforward and perhaps less costly, manner.
X AUTOMATIC ENROLMENT SUPPLEMENTARY RETIREMENT
SAVINGS SYSTEM 
A five-year roadmap for pension reform in Ireland was published in February 2018
(Government of Ireland, 2018a). Amongst other things, the roadmap commits to
setting “a formal benchmark of 34 per cent of average earnings for State pension
contributory payments by the end of 2018” (Government of Ireland, 2018a, p.5).
There is also a plan to introduce an auto-enrolment pension saving scheme for
private sector workers (Government of Ireland, 2018b), currently open for public
consultation, with implementation of the finalised scheme to commence from 2022.
The targeted group of the population, the default contribution rate, and the financial
incentives to save, are yet to be decided (ibid, p.17). Part of the action and
commitment plan outlined in the roadmap “will include an assessment of the
economic and social benefits delivered and an evaluation of equity in the
distribution of tax expenditure on pensions” (ibid., p.27).
The cost of incentivising pension savings by tax expenditures is measured in
billions per annum but the value of such incentives to pension savers is little
understood even by pension experts in Ireland, as outlined earlier. There are other
methods to incentivise pension savings which might be more successful and less
costly and complex than the current system. So, for instance, the current tax
incentivised encouragement could be replaced, on a cost neutral basis, by an explicit
state subsidy per €1 invested by an individual (perhaps up to some overall limits).
A version of this latter manner of incentivising saving was available in Ireland for
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the year ending April 2002, known as the Special Saving Incentive Account (SSIA),
where the State provided a top-up of €0.25 per €1 invested by the individual. This
savings scheme was generally regarded as successful, with total savings amounting
to €14 billion and 45 per cent of the accounts held by individuals earning less than
€20,000.4
It is a straightforward exercise to express the present value of tax reliefs for
pension savings as an explicit state subsidy of equal value. Table 4 expresses the
best estimate of the net effective rate of tax relief on pension savings as an explicit
state subsidy per €1 invested (after tax) on a cost neutral basis under our modelling
assumptions earlier. 
Table 4: Expressing the Net Effective Rate of Tax Relief as an Explicit State
Subsidy per €1 Invested
Salary            Married Person, one income                                 Single Person
p.a. (€)                         household                                                          
                    Best Estimate          Equivalent               Best Estimate            Equivalent
                 of Net Effective       Government             of Net Effective        Government
                           Rate              Subsidy per €1                   Rate               Subsidy per €1 
                                                      invested                                                    invested
5,000                   –5%                    -€ 0.05                          -1%                     –€ 0.01
10,000                 -1%                    -€ 0.01                          1%                      € 0.01
20,000                 -3%                    -€ 0.03                          25%                      € 0.33
30,000                 26%                     € 0.35                          26%                      € 0.35
40,000                 26%                     € 0.35                          49%                      € 0.96
50,000                 51%                     € 1.04                          42%                      € 0.72
60,000                 51%                     € 1.04                          38%                      € 0.61
70,000                 51%                     € 1.04                          37%                      € 0.59
80,000                 51%                     € 1.04                          36%                      € 0.56
90,000                 49%                     € 0.96                          36%                      € 0.56
100,000               46%                     € 0.85                          36%                      € 0.56
110,000               43%                     € 0.75                          36%                      € 0.56
120,000               41%                     € 0.69                          36%                      € 0.56
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
Note: Figures for the best estimate of the net effective rate of tax relief are from Table 2
earlier. 
Table 4 shows that the current manner of incentivising pension savings differs in
value depending on the earnings of the saver. A married person in a single income
household earning between €40,000 and €80,000 is effectively subsidised by
€1.04 from the State for every €1 invested. However, a person in the same
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4 https://www.rte.ie/news/business/2004/0826/53731-ssia. 
circumstance but earning less than €20,000 per annum is disincentivised from
pension saving – the State will take a small amount of money from such an
individual should they save for a pension. Setting aside considerations of equity, it
might be regarded as less than efficient to subsidise savers by over 100 per cent
when the SSIA scheme was so successful at a much lower subsidy from the State. 
Let us briefly consider how an auto-enrolment scheme might work in practice
in Ireland, assuming the stated commitment to maintain the State pension at 34 per
cent of average earnings. To do so requires us to consider the distribution of
earnings in Ireland, the assumed period of pension saving, the contribution rate and
the ultimate pension. The distribution of gross direct earnings after social insurance
payments in Ireland is studied in Collins (2016) and outlined in graphic and tabular
form below.
Figure 8: Distribution of Annual Direct Income in Ireland in 2014 
(Gross Income from All Sources before Social Welfare Payments but 
after Social Insurance Contributions)
Source: From data relating to the year 2014, kindly provided by Dr M. Collins. See Collins
(2016) for further information. The average annual earnings increase in Ireland was 1.5 per
cent in 2015 and 1.1 per cent in 2016 (CSO, 2017), so the current distribution of income is
unlikely to differ significantly from that shown above. 
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The NEST scheme, recently established by the Government in the UK, is an
auto-enrolment pension plan. Under the NEST scheme, the minimum contributions
are 8 per cent of relevant earnings5 from April 2019. Table 3 earlier shows that a
10 per cent contribution rate of total earnings in Ireland, even over a 25-year period,
is sufficient to provide a married person, one-income household, with a total
pension of over 50 per cent of pre-retirement pay on salaries of up to about €75,000
when the State pension is included. This represents the vast majority of married
households, accordingly to Figure 8. In fact, the 10 per cent contribution rate for
those on the average wage in Ireland will tend to over-provide for a pension even
with a 25-year saving period, as the replacement rate is over about 80 per cent.
Accordingly, a 10 per cent contribution rate even over a 25-year period must be
considered too high a contribution rate for the majority of earners in Ireland.
We estimate the expected pension from an auto-enrolment scheme if
contributions were made at a rate of 5 per cent over a complete career of 40 years.
The results, shown in Box 3, sets out the expected pension of all persons in Ireland
with some direct income and the best estimate of the net effective tax relief granted
on their pension savings under the current tax code assuming they are married.
Alternative figures assuming the individuals are taxed as single individuals are
shown in Appendix 4. Again, Box 3 and Appendix 4 highlight that, for the vast
majority of earners in Ireland, a 5 per cent contribution rate over a 40-year career
would provide a total pension, when combined with the State pension that exceeds
the usual replacement rates of 50 per cent or even 67 per cent of salary. The net
effective rate of tax relief under the current system, if not reformed, is shown to be
regressive. 
XI CONCLUSION 
Our analysis shows that tax relief granted on pension savings is, in the majority of
cases, not deferred taxation but no taxation. As such, the cost to the State of
incentivising pension savings in this manner is greater than previously estimated.
No tax is paid at any stage for pension funds at retirement less than nine times the
average salary for a married couple (about €0.33 million) or four times the average
salary for a single person (about €0.15 million). The cost of the tax expenditure
depends primarily on the marginal tax rate of the pension saver and the size of the
pension fund at the point of retirement. The cost of the tax subsidy for pension
saving varies from zero for those on low incomes, to 25-30 per cent for standard
rate tax-payers, and to 31 per cent to 51 per cent for higher rate tax-payers per
(before-tax) Euro saved. This converts to a subsidy of €0 per €1 invested after tax
for lower earners, a subsidy of €0.33-€0.43 per €1 invested after tax for standard
rate tax-payers, and a subsidy of €0.45-€1.04 per €1 invested after tax for higher
rate tax-payers.
5 https://www.nestpensions.org.uk/schemeweb/nest/aboutnest/pensions-are-changing/auto-enrolment.html.
The results of our modelling explain the finding in Collins and Hughes (2017)
that, although a minority in overall numbers, higher rate tax-payers represent the
vast majority of pension savers. In short, under the current incentive regime the tax
advantages from saving for a pension are significantly higher to higher rate tax-
payers than those paying at the standard rate. The structure of the incentive, tied to
the tax system, discourages regular pension savings from those on low pay, or with
irregular work patterns, where the value of the reliefs offered can be zero or even
negative over periods. This helps explain the pension gap by gender, as women are
more likely to fall into these lower income categories (see Collins (2016), especially
Table 5a).
The Government has long been concerned with the low supplementary pension
provision and the low replacement rate of income after retirement for the majority
of workers, and especially lower paid workers. The tax-based incentive system for
pension saving, in disproportionately favouring higher rate tax-payers, must take
part responsibility for the lower pension provision amongst the lower paid. A better
outcome for the considerable tax expenditures, in terms of numbers of pension
savers, could be achieved by abolishing tax incentives and replaced them by a
matching contribution of, say, €1 State contribution for each €1.6 saved (which is
an effective subsidy of 38 per cent) as recommended by the Commission on
Taxation (2009). 
Any reform in the tax-based incentive for private pension saving would need
to be reflected in a similar reform of public sector pensions and the division of their
cost between the worker and the State. The Commission on Taxation (2009)
highlighted this when it recommended that 
… the regime for non-funded pensions should be examined to identify the
implicit tax cost to the Exchequer in the context of an equitable distribution
of the tax expenditure on pensions. (p.374). 
The current tax-based incentive system for pension savings is regressive. The
value of tax incentives appears to be little understood even by pension experts in
Ireland, including the Society of Actuaries in Ireland. A more straightforward
incentive to save for retirement is required. The existing coupling of incentives to
save for additional pension to the tax system is unnecessarily complex and results
in many workers not understanding, engaging or benefiting from the tax reliefs
available. The State could achieve a more comprehensive pension system by a better
targeting of the considerable tax expenditure. In any event, on the grounds of equity
alone, consideration should be given to reforming the current incentive system
before the proposed imminent introduction of an auto-enrolment pension scheme
for private sector workers. 
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APPENDIX 1: TAX RELIEF ON PENSION CONTRIBUTIONS AND
TAXATION RATES
Tax Relief on Pension Contributions
Tax relief on an employee’s contributions is granted at the individual’s marginal
rate of tax, subject to certain contribution limits which are age related. There is no
relief with respect to PRSI and the Universal Social Charge. The maximum tax
relief available is expressed as a percentage of remuneration:
Age                            Limit as % of remuneration         Maximum Tax Relief Available
Under 30 years         15% of net relevant earnings                         €17,250
30 to 39 years                               20%                                            €23,000
40 to 49 years                               25%                                            €28,750
50 to 54 years:                              30%                                            €34,500
55 to 59 years                               35%                                            €40,250
60 and over                                  40%                                            €46,000
The maximum level of remuneration that is currently allowable for tax relief for
pension contributions is €115,000 per annum.
Employer contributions to pension arrangements are fully deductible for
corporation tax purposes up to certain limits. Contributions paid by employers to
occupational pension schemes are not treated as a benefit-in-kind to the employee
(and can be paid in addition to the contribution limits for employee contributions).
Contributions paid by employers to PRSAs are treated as a benefit-in-kind
but income tax relief is provided, subject to the overall contribution limits for
employee contributions. Employer contributions to PRSAs are not subject to PRSI
or the Universal Social Charge.
A fuller outline of tax reliefs on pension savings is available on The Pensions
Authority website: http://www.pensionsauthority.ie/en/LifeCycle/Tax. OECD
(2015a) gives an overview and international comparison of tax reliefs available in
other EU and OECD countries. 
Taxation Rates
In undertaking our calculations, we used the 2017 Irish Tax Code, rates and reliefs
as summarised below.
                  An Analysis of Taxation Supports for Private Pension Provision in Ireland                353
Pre-Retirement:
Married, Single Income Household
Standard Rate Tax Band                             €42,800
Tax Rates                                                    20% & 40%
PRSI                                                            4%
USC                                                            0.50%          Up to €12,012.00
                                                                    2.50%          From €12,012.01 to €18,772
                                                                    5%               From €18,772 to €70,044.00
                                                                    8%               From €70,044.01
Personal Tax Credit                                     €3,300
Employee PAYE Tax Credit                        €1,650
Single                                                          
Standard Rate Tax Band                             €33,800
Tax Rates                                                    20% & 40%
PRSI                                                            4%
USC                                                            0.50%          Up to €12,012.00
                                                                    2.50%          From €12,012.01 to €18,772
                                                                    5%               From €18,772 to €70,044.00
                                                                    8%               From €70,044.01
Personal Tax Credit                                     €1,650
Employee PAYE Tax Credit                        €1,650
Post Retirement:
Married, with qualifying dependant              
Standard Rate Tax Band                             €42,800
Tax Rates                                                    20% & 40%
*PRSI                                                          0%
**USC – Aggregate income <€60,000      0.50%           Up to €12,012.00
                                                                   2.50%           From €12,012.01
**USC – Aggregate income >€60,000      0.50%           Up to €12,012.00
                                                                   2.50%           From €12,012.01 to €18,772
                                                                   5%                From €18,772 to €70,044.00
                                                                   8%                From €70,044.01
Personal Tax Credit                                    €3,300
Earned income tax credit                            €950
Age Tax Credit                                            €490
State Pension                                              €23,575
Tax exemption limit for people 
aged 65 and over                                         €36,000
*Assume over age 66   ** Assume over age 70
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Post Retirement: (contd.)
Single                                                        
Standard Rate Tax Band                             €33,800
Tax Rates                                                    20% & 40%
PRSI                                                           0%*
USC – Aggregate income <€60,000                               
                                                                   0.50%            Up to €12,012.00
                                                                   2.50%            From €12,012.01
USC – Aggregate income >€60,000         0.50%            Up to €12,012.00
                                                                   2.50%            From €12,012.01 to €18,772
                                                                   5%                 From €18,772 to €70,044.00
                                                                   8%                 From €70,044.01
Personal Tax Credit                                    €1,650
Earned income tax credit                           €950
Age Tax Credit                                           €245
State Pension                                              €12,434
Tax exemption limit for people 
aged 65 and over                                        €18,000
*Assume over age 66   ** Assume over age 70
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APPENDIX 2: TAX RELIEF ON PENSION BENEFITS
Tax relief on pension benefits is subject to an upper limit. The limit (known as the
Standard Fund Threshold (SFT)) is a limit or ceiling on the total capital value of
pension benefits that an individual can draw from tax-relieved pension
arrangements. From 1 January 2014, the absolute value of the SFT is €2 million. 
Pension benefits can generally be taken in two forms: regular annual pension
amounts and a lump sum payment. 
An individual’s annual pension is subject to income taxation at their marginal
rate of tax.
Subject to a certain limit, currently €200,000, an individual may receive a tax-
free lump sum. Lump sum payments valued between €200,000–€500,000 will be
subject to taxation at a rate of 20 per cent. Lump sum payments in excess of
€500,000 will be subject to taxation at the individual’s marginal rate of tax (and
also USC).
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APPENDIX 3: TAXATION OF INVESTMENT INCOME OR GAIN
Pension fund investments are generally exempt from tax on any investment income
and capital gains. However, other savings are subject to tax on investment income
or capital gains as described in brief below. 
In determining an appropriate tax rate for the investment assets held within a
pension fund, we have considered the tax applicable to the various investment
classes generally held within Irish pension funds: cash, equities, bonds and property.
We have also considered the tax payable on funds held by Life and Pension
Companies.
Investment in cash is currently subject to Deposit Interest Retention Tax
(DIRT). For 2017, DIRT is charged at 39 per cent on all interest payments. It was
announced in Budget 2017 that the DIRT rate would decrease by 2 per cent each
year from 2018 to 2020 until it reaches 33 per cent. 
Income from investment in equities is subject to income tax at an individual’s
marginal rate and capital gains are taxed at a rate of 33 per cent on any gains in
excess of €1,270 per person per annum. PRSI and USC may also be due on any
dividends received.
Property investments are subject to income tax at an individual’s marginal rate
on rent received and capital gains tax at a rate of 33 per cent on any gains made in
excess of €1,270 per person per annum. PRSI and USC may also be due on any
income received.
Irish government bonds are subject to income tax at an individual’s marginal
rate on any income received but are exempt from capital gains tax. Other non-
government bonds are subject to both capital gains tax at 33 per cent (above the
threshold) and income tax. 
Investments in life assurance policies or unit-linked funds are taxed on a gross
roll up basis, i.e. the income and gains are allowed to build up tax free in the funds
and are taxed on exit or deemed exit. If there is no exit in the meantime, then there
is a deemed exit every eight years and tax is paid at this point. The tax paid on the
eight-year deemed exit is available as a credit against the tax due on the ultimate
exit. The current rate of exit tax for most plans is 41 per cent (with effect from 1
January 2014). 
Our modelling assumes a total investment return during the accumulation phase
of 4.5 per cent per annum before tax. Rolling this return up over an eight-year period
and then subjecting the overall increase to a 41 per cent tax rate at the end of the
period produces the same result as an annual rate of tax on the investment return of
37 per cent.
For Personal Portfolio Life Plans or “wrapper” products the rate is no longer
linked to the standard rate of tax and is now a rate of 60 per cent. Where the life
plan is owned by a company the rate of exit tax was reduced to 25 per cent with
effect from 1 January 2012. 
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Further general information on the Irish taxation code as it currently applies
to savings can be found, amongst other places, here: http://www.citizens
information.ie/en/money_and_tax/tax. 
The brief overview of the tax code and rates on non-pension savings highlights
a complex issue. We can see that those not subject to income tax due to income
level being too low can skew their savings portfolio towards income generating
assets, and hence reduce the overall tax they must pay on savings. This entails that
the tax advantages offered on the investment returns from pension saving is of little
value to this group. However, those with so low an income as to be exempt from
income tax are unlikely pension savers. Of more significance are the groups of
pension savers subject to income tax at the standard rate (20 per cent) or the higher
rate (40 per cent). Collins and Hughes (2017), as mentioned earlier, estimate that
29.4 per cent of pension savers in Ireland in 2014 pay income tax at the standard
rate and 70.6 per cent pay tax at the higher rate. Those on the standard rate might
invest more in income generating assets, which are taxed at 20 per cent as opposed
to the 33 per cent on capital gains. This suggests that the effective tax relief on
investment income (income and capital gains) on pension savings for the standard
rate tax-payer would be in the range 20 per cent to 33 per cent, and probably closer
to 20 per cent. Higher rate tax-payers are subject to income tax at 40 per cent and
capital gains tax at 33 per cent, so might favour assets that generate capital gains
over those that produce income to reduce the overall tax liability. This suggests that
the effective tax relief on investment income (income and capital gains) on pension
savings for the higher rate tax-payer would be in the range 33 per cent to 40 per
cent, and probably closer to 33 per cent. 
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